Distinguishing Development Agencies from Colonial Bureaus Exercising Soft Power: Reforming Imperial Economics and its Administration

This article offers a method for examining the actual functions of agen-cies that identify as doing ‘development’ work, both overseas and domestically, in a way that helps to separate two areas of legitimate functions – development as defined under international legal instruments and ‘disaster management’ (along with relief, poverty reduction, and global risks to health and climate) – from inappropriate or illegal activities that fit various definitions of colonialism (including internal) and imperialism in contemporary globalization. Quick applications can be used to screen several international and domestic ‘development’ organizations to suggest partial or serious deviations from their stated missions. Use of a two-part test suggests that most international organizations, government ‘development’ agencies, and agencies with domestic roles for ‘development’ are failing to separate disaster management functions from development and/or are pursuing colonial policies under the guise of development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is offered as a brief case study.

Keywords: development agencies, globalization, hegemony, colonialism, soft power, imperialism, sovereignty, functional analysis, public administration, UNDP.

The full version of the article

This article offers a method for examining the actual functions of agencies that identify as doing ‘development’ work, both overseas and domestically, in a way that helps to separate two areas of legitimate functions – development as defined under international legal instruments and ‘disaster management’ (along with relief, poverty reduction, and global risks to health and climate) – from inappropriate or illegal activities that fit various definitions of colonialism (including internal) and imperialism in contemporary globalization. Quick applications can be used to screen several international and domestic ‘development’ organizations to suggest partial or serious deviations from their stated missions. Use of a two-part test suggests that most international organizations, government ‘development’ agencies, and agencies with domestic roles for ‘development’ are failing to separate disaster management functions from development and/or are pursuing colonial policies under the guise of development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is offered as a brief case study.

Keywords: development agencies, globalization, hegemony, colonialism, soft power, imperialism, sovereignty, functional analysis, public administration, UNDP.

The full version of the article

Introduction

As this article is being written, policy debates are continuing in several countries over the appropriate missions and functions of ‘development’ agencies and their boundaries. Meanwhile, several countries that are themselves receiving foreign aid and ‘development bank’ loans are, themselves, running their own ‘aid’ projects and providing loans to their poorer or weaker neighbors. Within their own borders, these countries that are both donors and recipients have domestic agencies that have their own stated ‘development’ missions, such as departments of ‘agriculture and rural development’ and ‘minority peoples’ or ‘mountain peoples’ commissions that claim to be ‘developing’ them. ‘Developed’ countries also have such bureaus for ‘urban development’ and minority peoples’ affairs (such as the ‘Bureau of Indian Affairs’ in the United States).

In the theory and history of public administration, the emergence of ‘development’ agencies both internationally (as adjuncts of Ministries of Foreign Affairs) and domestically, is relatively new and the appropriateness or legitimacy of their interventions in ‘development’ in fulfilling the definitions and standards of ‘development’ under international law is subject to question (Lempert 2014b). While there is a healthy debate today over the measures and goals of ‘development’, there is less examination of the actual public administration of the functions of ‘development’ within public administration as well as its relative position to other domestic and foreign agencies, as well as international agencies.

Governments have typically recognized the functions of foreign affairs in the promotion of peace and security as well as cross boundary concerns, while seeking to fit ‘development’ somewhere into this agenda, but have offered less attention to protecting international development objectives from being subservient to or manipulated and replaced by conflicts of interest. At the same time, domestically, the functions and missions of providing for general welfare of communities has often been merged with ‘development’ of those communities in ways that promote central government objectives for control and advance that are also rife with conflicts of interest and without safeguards or protections of community and individual rights that are part of the internationally recognized commitments of ‘development’.

In recent articles, this author identified the elements that constitute the consensus under international law for ‘development’ that are universally recognized and embedded in international laws and treaties (Lempert 2014a, 2014b) and also distinguished and defined the elements for international interventions to achieve the very different goal of ‘poverty reduction’ (Lempert 2016c). This ‘codification’ of international development law offers the tools for measuring legal compliance and for holding international donors, multi-lateral development banks and other international organizations, and international non-governmental organizations accountable.¹

What these measures reveal is that most organizations that self-identify as ‘development’ banks or ‘development’ agencies are not in fact engaged in ‘development’ or ‘poverty reduction’ under the standards of international law. In fact, they are doing something else that includes both legitimate and illegitimate functions. These tests, however, merely reveal what these agencies are not doing to meet internationally agreed goals of ‘development’. They do not specify what they are doing.

This article offers a method for examining the actual functions of agencies that identify as doing ‘development’ work, both overseas and domestically, in a way that helps to separate two areas of legitimate functions – development as defined under international legal instruments and ‘disaster management’ (including relief, poverty reduction, and global risks to health and climate) – from inappropriate or illegal activities that fit various definitions of colonialism (including internal) and imperialism. An understanding of these and other functions can help to improve government efficiency in the rational placement of functions as well as allow for citizen and international oversight to expose illegitimate functions.

While there are no specific measures or ratings of agencies as a whole, the criteria in this article can be used to hold specific programs and budget categories to public administration standards and can be used in conjunction with previously published legal accountability indicators in the development field that are published by the author. Quick applications of the elements offered in the article can be used to screen several international and domestic ‘development’ organizations to suggest partial or serious deviations from their stated missions.

The print version of this article is a very short version of the full article that will appear later on this journal's internet site. That article will offer more comprehensive documentation and argument for what is admittedly a very complex subject condensed even there in a short space and requiring a concentrated effort by readers beyond that of most articles. This version is annotated to note where readers may wish to seek the substantive discussions in the longer piece.

Principles of Governmental Professionalism and of Theoretical Place for Development (General)

While there does not appear to be any formulaic approach for the placement of the role of ‘development’ in public administration theory, partly because the ideas of ‘development’ and its components like ‘sustainable development’ are relatively recent, it is possible to derive the places that these roles would fit, both in domestic government functions and in international affairs functions of governments. Taking an inductive approach to the structuring of government administration reveals different theories of government organization that are used today and shows where ‘development’ functions fit, while also helping to troubleshoot missing functions in contemporary government systems.

Overview of Public Administration Systems

Though most public administration theory seems to focus on issues of accountability and efficiency, rather than government administration structure (Bryson 1988; Emmanuel, Merchant, and Otley 1990; Garrison, Noreen, and Brewer 2005; Nelson and Quick 2005; Robbins 2002; Szporluk 2009), there have been studies of government organization looking at various government ‘functions’ and where they are placed (Lyden 1975; Myakawa 2000).

Regardless of the political form of government – whether a country is a ‘developed’ country, a ‘democracy’, a colonial government administered by an outside power and its military, a one-party military dictatorship, or other form of rule – the general organization of public administration systems is similar at the national level. What makes governments different are the roles of citizens in and strength of the judiciary, the legislative branch, local governments, and civil society.

The general role of public administration is the same: that of measuring and protecting a country's assets in all forms (though the ownership and administration of those assets differs with the distributions of economic and political power) with two competing but complementary goals; improving and developing the productivity of and enjoyment from those assets and protecting those assets for future generations. Most public administration analysis focuses on the strength, efficiency and accountability of these functions for the different assets rather than the overall logic of where they fit in a public administration system. (The full detail of this organization is described in the longer version of this article, but it is presented in the tables with this piece.)

Placement of Development Functions within Public Administration Systems

Even though one may not be able to find any ‘development’ agency or ministry in a government system today, making it difficult to identify where international development agencies should coordinate their efforts in countries where they intervene (other than directly with the offices of Presidents or Prime Ministers), it is clear where these functions should fit in the overall scheme of government administration. It is also clear how such functions and interventions are corrupted and they fulfill different functions (placed elsewhere) or inappropriate functions (not in the logic of protection of national assets).

Tables 1, 2 and 3 (shown here in a short version with a comprehensive version on-line), below, offer an idealized, though highly abbreviated, view of national level public administration functions. The three tables present the three levels of functions described in the longer piece. What goes beyond this (and will be detailed in following sections) are the specific relations across the three levels in the areas of ‘development’ and international affairs.

Table 1

Idealized Government Functions in Model of Governmental Organization: Overarching Planning and Balancing Functions

Table 1 presents the overall planning functions. This is exactly where ‘development’ fits and is also something lacking almost everywhere today. In this Table, the functions of ‘development’ are split into two planning categories. One is ‘sustainable development’ in line with international treaties and professional measures for the long-term balance of production and consumption within the constraints of the environment, for countries and for cultures and communities within countries (Lempert and Nguyen 2008). The second is the overall goal of the society for defining and promoting ‘progress’ in various areas that it chooses, such as technological/economic, social, and political (Lempert 2014a, 2014b, 2016b). A third category is that of international agreements for long-term global goals and planning beyond those already established in the categories of sustainable development and other areas of development and progress.

Table 2 presents a list of other overall government management functions that apply to all of the line functions. The three main areas are those of international security and domestic security (to protect the system as a whole) and the system of government administration, itself.

All three tables, and particularly Table 3, with the presentation of line functions in categories of national ‘assets’ as well as areas of human activity (economic, social, and political) as well as of individual human development and protection, include a category for ‘complementary and counterbalancing’ functions. This column is the key to differentiating whether government functions are ‘developing’ and protecting assets sustainably or whether they are exploiting them for short-term benefit.

The idea of these complementary and counterbalancing functions is one of the key features of sustainable development and of development and progress.

These Tables are a useful basis for distinguishing appropriate development functions from other legitimate functions domestically and internationally (such as disaster management and other functions related to global peace and security) as well as those that are inappropriate. Governments that place ‘development’ in line ministries and without the full set of functions that are envisioned as development (Lempert 2014b and presented in detail below, particularly in Table 6) or that create ministries for specific groups (indigenous or minority or rural communities) are likely viewing peoples directly as assets to be exploited by those not members of those groups. Those are signs of inappropriate, colonial exploitation. (See the longer piece for a full description of how this works.)

Table 2

Idealized Government Functions in Model of Governmental Organization: General Governmental Administration and Protection Functions

Table 2 continued

Table 3

Idealized Government Functions in Model of Governmental Organization: Line Ministry/Department Functions (Short version only!)

Table 3 continued

Note: A full version of this table is presented in the longer piece.

Placement of Development Agency Functions within International Governance Functions and Separating Functions of Development from Functions of Disaster Management and Other Possible Overlaps

While ‘development’ is among the domestic missions of governments for achieving sustainability and achieving certain ends of ‘progress’, it is also a potential function of all governments in their international relations. As but one of many possible line functions of governments in international interventions, it can be distinguished in different ways from these other functions as part of a logic of oversight and efficiency of international affairs functions. Expanding and clarifying the functions of government in international relations for short-term conflict resolution and international crises and for long-term promotion of international interests helps to separate the legitimate functions of international development from other functions.

The previous tables showed how the general function of global development was part of overall policy functions (Table 1) and differed, in international relations, from the security concerns of governments for their overall protections (Table 2).

Tables 4 and 5 take these different international functions from these previous tables and place them together to show how they relate to each other for coordination and to define their boundaries (including conflicts of interest that require their separation).

Table 4 defines categories of international affairs functions by the interests that governments try to promote and whether they are long-term and global or short-term national (self)-interest. Within these two overall categories of long-term global and short-term national interest, the short-term interests can be divided into short-term functions that need to be balanced, since they can lead to colonialism or imperialism if they are not checked by global interests, and those that do not seem to present such danger.

In the category of functions that promote short-term interests and that have the danger of leading to colonialism or imperialism are military, commercial, and information promoting functions. All of these functions are legitimate parts of protecting security and promoting national interest, but if they are not checked by international law and by national self-restraint to promote long-term global interests of sustainable development, autonomy, and peace, they lead to dangers.

Note that in this table ‘development’ is in the category of long-term global interest functions and in this category only. Also in the category of long-term global interest functions is disaster management (e.g., management of climate change). Disaster management is a security function and it has components of both long-term and short term national security protection; some which provide for long-term global security and some that are just national security concerns (e.g., providing relief to neighbors to prevent regional refugee crises).

Table 4

International Affairs Oversight Functions and Relations to Line Ministry/ Departments

International Affairs Oversight Functions	Related Line Ministry/Department Functions
Foreign Diplomacy: Short-Term Interest Promotion that is appropriate but requires checks against abuse	Military; Commerce; Information and Promotion
Foreign Diplomacy: Short-Term Conflict Resolution	International Law Enforcement/Legal Accountability and International Governance (including Indemnifications); Global Security Management/Short-Term Threat Management (Poverty Alleviation, Cross-Border Crime Prevention); Relief (Crisis Insurance)
Foreign Diplomacy: Long-Term Global Interest Promotion [The Counterbalancing Function to Above]	International Development; Disaster Management (Long-Term)

Table 5 takes the same two broad categories and presents each of the line functions identified in the second column of Table 4 as separate lines in the left column. The purpose of the table is to identify each of these line functions as separate and distinct from the function of ‘development’ (that is not listed in the table). Though functions like ‘relief’ and ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘disaster management’ (in general) are often identified as development functions of international development agencies in their interventions, the international community sees them as distinct and they are presented distinctly in this table. The second column in the table helps to explain the need for these distinctions by stressing the conflicts of interest and overlaps that can occur between these separate functions and ‘development’. (The longer piece describes in more detail some of the confusion that often occurs in distinguishing ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘development’.)

Table 5

International Affairs Line Functions Other than ‘Development’ (Long-Term, Humanitarian Support)

Table 5 continued

Principles of Development and Compliance with International Law, with Suggestions for Placement of Functions

While it is easy to separate out legitimate international affairs functions of government that are not development from those that are, it is more difficult to assure that the functions of a ‘development’ agency (whether for international development or forms of domestic development) do not include those functions that are outside the international legal definition of development and that are essentially outside the law. Interventions, both internationally and domestically, that have elements of colonialism or imperialism, are too often mixed in with ‘development’ functions without any type of screening or oversight; largely a result of the pernicious (and continuing) legacy of imperialism and colonialism. This section focuses on the ways to identify legitimate development functions under international law and their appropriate placement in public administration, while the next section offers some of the ways for spotting inappropriate development functions, disguising colonial and imperial agendas.

The international community recognizes 13 total elements of ‘development’ in four different categories. These are the areas of individual development (6): physical (body) development, mental/intellectual development in culturally appropriate ways, spiritual development (appreciation of the natural world), moral development (appreciation of others), social development (appreciation of one's community), and cultural development (appreciation of one's cultural identity); societal level development (3): social equity/ social progress/ equal opportunity for individuals, political equity/ equal rights for individuals, and peace/ tolerance/ demilitarization for individuals; cultural/community level development (1): sustainability (sovereignty) of cultures; and global development (3): social equity/ social progress/ equal opportunity for cultural survival and difference, political equity/ equal rights for cultures (effective federalism), and peace/ tolerance/ demilitarization for protection of cultures (Lempert 2014a, 2014b).

Table 6 (here in a short version) presents a summary form of these 13 categories of development and their linked Universal Development Goal missions in the left hand columns. In the right hand column are the specific line agencies in government that either already do or should have the responsibility for implementing these development functions and achieving the goals. Many of these can and do fall into the responsibility of different agencies given overlapping concerns, but could be assigned to specific agencies as the lead agency.

Table 6

Universally Recognized Aspirations for Development (‘Universal Development Goals’) and the Placement of Government Functions for Domestic and for Foreign Interventions (Short version, only)

Table 6 continued

Note: This is a short version of the table, only, with the full measures available in the full table on line.

Principles of Imperialism and Colonialism, Distinguished from Development

Colonialism and imperialism have been subjects of social science study for more than a century (starting with Marx 1867; Hobson 1902; Kautsky 1914; Lenin 1926) and international laws and agreements, particularly in the period immediately following World War II, have criminalized many of their attributes (particularly those of genocide and crimes against humanity) while establishing international guidelines on particular behaviors of nations that are to be abandoned. Nevertheless, it is rare to find public agencies using any kind of mechanism to screen their activities in order to eliminate any forms of colonialism and imperialism either internally, in community and minority relations, or in international interventions. It is possible to generate a screening tool to identify colonial and imperial activities of public functions on the basis both of mechanisms and objectives to promote national or domestically dominant interests to the detriment of other nations or of weaker domestic cultures and communities. This section offers a brief model of how to do that.

Contemporary studies of imperialism and colonialism, in attempts to reveal their root causes, have focused on the inequalities of ‘free trade’ (Gallagher and Robinson 1953) and the creation of ‘dependency’ and forms of hegemony (Prebisch 1949; Wallerstein 1979), in both pluralistic and centralized economic systems (Said 1994; Comaroff and Comaroff 1986). In contrast to colonialism, imperial systems may exploit resources of weaker peoples for strategic military benefit (Gallaher et al. 2009; Howe 2002). Today, the combined approach of hegemony is often exerted through ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004) approaches to ‘neo-colonialism’ (Klein 2007; Moyo 1999; Raffer and Singer 1996; Stiglitz 2002, Grinin, Ilyin, and Andreev 2016).

Tables 7 and 8, focusing on the mechanisms and the policies of colonialism and imperialism, are attempts to offer a starting point for such a screening indicator or checklist that can be used to unmask colonial (neo-colonial) and imperial agendas in an attempt to eliminate them from ‘development’ agencies as inappropriate (and possibly a basis for criminal sanctions).

Table 8, focusing on the specific policies of colonialism and imperialism, applied directly to the targets of exploitation, is in two parts. It creates a list of the different resources that are targets of colonial and imperial exploitation (with the table split in two parts to distinguish these two forms). The right hand column offers many of the ideological justifications that are used today by international ‘development’ agencies to attempt to dislodge those resources for exploitation by outsiders. In most cases, the ideological justifications that they use (and convince public officials in weaker countries to also espouse) directly undermine the functions and legal requirements for development that are established under international law and accepted practice. For example, the use of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), a measure of sales, as a goal, is a direct violation of the basic principles of accounting, wealth creation and wealth protection, and indicative of this hidden agenda.

Table 7, focusing on mechanisms of colonialism and imperialism, is both a summary and a complementary table to Table 8. Table 7 takes the different policies (and ideologies) that are found in contemporary colonial and imperial exploitation and links them to specific ‘development’ interventions as a way of spotting abuses. In Table 7, the goals of using ‘development’ interventions to manipulate foreign governments in ways that promote colonialism and imperialism are divided into three categories: promotion of colonial economic relations, increasing the top-down authority and control of the leadership in the recipient country so that it can participate more effectively and directly in the exploitation of the peoples and resources of that country, and the detachment of an elite (governmental and non-governmental) in the recipient country from the peoples of that country so as to make the country more vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation with the participation of outsiders. For each of these goals, it is possible to identify specific development ‘projects’ with particular agencies in a recipient country. Existence of such projects is not direct ‘proof’ of colonial and/or imperial exploitation or intent, but it is highly suspect (a ‘red flag’) or such intent, particularly if the development agency's projects do not include a focus and evidence of spending on the very types of projects that are central to development under international law.

Table 7

Contemporary Soft Power Policies Associated with Colonialism and Imperialism, Often Disguised as ‘Development’: Mechanisms Used for Exercise of Soft-Power and Hegemonic Control

Table 7 continued

Table 8

Contemporary Soft Power Policies Associated with Colonialism, Often Disguised as ‘Development’ (Detail)

Table 8 continued

Table 8 continued

Table 9

Contemporary Soft Power Policies Associated with Imperialism, Often Disguised as ‘Development’

Targeted Resource	How Resource is Exploited	Affiliated Policy to Create Vulnerability
Land
– Military Bases	Militarism of land	Militarization to designate a ‘common enemy’
– Weapons testing	Degradation of land	Sacrifice for a reputed ‘common enemy’
Resources
– Denial to competitive country	Disruption of culture and sustainability	Sacrifice for a reputed ‘common enemy’
Labor
– Soldiers	Death for a foreign benefit	Sacrifice for a reputed ‘common enemy’

Tests of Government Functions Placed in ‘Development’ Agencies, Foreign and Domestic

This section offers two quick tests that can be used as indicators to measure and assure that development agencies, either internationally or domestically, adhere to the principles of public administration and the requirements of international development law. (The on-line version of this article notes the failures of the international community to offer such a test to date in the Paris Declaration (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and Transparency Initiative in Busan (Busan Partnership… 2011) and describes more fully how to use the test.)

By simply asking two sets of four questions, practitioners and the public can make basic determinations on whether development agencies have appropriate distinguished their appropriate functions (the first test) and whether they have screened out functions that are potentially in violation of international law because they promote colonialism and/or imperialist national self-interest (the second test).

Note that both sets of tests can be applied to both development agencies of national governments as well as international organizations of different types that claim to act in the sphere of development, including development banks and multi-lateral international development agencies.

Question I.1. Recognition of Public Administration Practice of Separating Different Competing Functions where there are Conflicts of Interest. Has the governmental organization recognized two distinct areas of international concern – ‘development’ (from the perspective of the sustainability of specific cultures) and disaster management (an overall international goal for short-term security from specific recognized threats) and has it separated these functions into distinct agencies or departments with attempts to avoid conflicts of interest so as to assure the objectives and outcomes are independent?

Scoring: Yes – 1.

Debatable – 0.5.

No or not relevant – (0).

Question I.2. Recognition of Short Term ‘Relief’ as Distinct from Development. Has the governmental recognized specific distinct areas of international concern – ‘development’ (from the perspective of the long-term sustainability of specific cultures) and short-term disaster relief to avoid instability, crisis and starvation, and to act as insurance supporting current practices (an overall international goal for short-term security from specific recognized threats) and has it separated these functions into distinct agencies or departments with attempts to avoid conflicts of interest so as to assure the objectives and outcomes are independent?

Scoring: Yes – 1.

Debatable – 0.5.

No or not relevant – (0).

Question I.3. Recognition of Short-Term ‘Poverty Alleviation’ as Distinct from Development. Has the governmental organization recognized specific distinct areas of international concern – ‘development’ (from the perspective of the long-term sustainability of specific cultures) and short-term ‘poverty alleviation’ that increases productivity or consumption (through foreign investment or sale of resource assets or foreign directed promotion of trade or industry) to avoid instability, crisis and starvation, and to act as insurance supporting current practices (an overall international goal for short-term security from specific recognized threats) rather than long-term sustainable consumption, addressing root causes of poverty and assuring security and balance within the recipient group's resource base, and has it separated these functions into distinct agencies or departments with attempts to avoid conflicts of interest so as to assure the objectives and outcomes are independent? (See Lempert 2015d for specific detail use of this indicator.)

Scoring: Yes – 1.

Debatable – 0.5.

No or not relevant – (0).

Question I.4. Does the Organization Recognize Indemnification and Compensation as Distinct from Development. Has the governmental organization recognized specific distinct areas of international concern – ‘development’ (from the perspective of the long-term sustainability of specific cultures) and short-term compensation for past harms an international actor has created through war or hegemony (an overall international goal for holding countries accountable through the international justice system) and has it separated these functions into distinct agencies or departments with attempts to avoid conflicts of interest so as to assure the objectives and outcomes are independent?

Scoring: Yes – 1.

Debatable – 0.5.

No or not relevant – (0).

Question II.1. Promotion of the Four Levels and 13 Categories of Development Established by the International Community in its Post-World War II Consensus for Reversing Colonialism. Does the governmental organization recognize the key components of ‘development’ incorporated in the key Post-World War II treaties for cultural survival, and sustainability, including local community/ cultural choices of consumption, production and economic and social life, that can be listed as the ‘Universal Development Goals’ in ways that avoid conflicts of interest with foreign agendas for globalization, assimilation, trade, nation-states, and political relations? (Lempert 2014a, 2014b)

Scoring: Yes – 1.

Debatable – 0.5.

No or not relevant – (0).

Question II.2. Establishes Controls to Prevent Development Interventions from Serving as Mechanisms for Promoting Colonial Economic Relations. Does the governmental organization recognize the conflicts of interest between strategies for promoting ‘economic growth’ (consumption and production), trade, foreign investment, decentralization, and infrastructure and the needs for sustainable development, cultural protections, sovereignty protections and other keys to ‘development’ and take steps to prevent distortions that promote foreign interests and colonial or imperial agendas? (Lempert 2009a, 2012, 2015d)

Scoring: Yes – 1.

Debatable – 0.5.

No or not relevant – (0).

Question II.3. Establishes Controls to Prevent Development Interventions from becoming Mechanisms for Strengthening Top-Down Authority and Control by a Leadership that is Linked to Foreign Interests. Does the governmental organization recognize the conflicts of interest between strategies for protecting ‘rights’, good governance, equity, and social protection and the solidification of military and police powers that reinforce inequalities and can undermine local development agendas and needs in favor of promoting elite and foreign interests, and take steps to prevent distortions such distortions? (Lempert 2011, 2010)

Scoring: Yes – 1.

Debatable – 0.5.

No or not relevant – (0).

Question II.4. Establishes Controls to Prevent Interventions from Serving as Mechanisms for the Strengthening of Elites and Detachment of Elites from Local Communities and Peoples and their Interests for ‘Development’. Does the governmental organization recognize the conflicts of interest between strategies for promoting ‘capacity building’, governance, and the needs for sustainable development, cultural protections, governmental transparency and accountability, economic equity and other keys to ‘development’ and take steps to prevent distortions that strengthen an elite to promote foreign interests and colonial or imperial agendas? (Lempert 2009b, 2011, 2015e)

Scoring: Yes – 1.

Debatable – 0.5.

No or not relevant – (0).

Applying the Test to Various ‘Development’ Agencies, in Brief

After understanding how the indicator works, it is generally easy to apply to several kinds of public agencies. What the two tests reveal is that most international organizations, government ‘development’ agencies, and agencies with domestic roles for ‘development’ are failing to separate disaster management functions from development and/or are pursuing colonial policies under the guise of development with no attempts to screen or prevent conflicts of interest that undermine international development law and goals. Indeed, the author is aware of no government development agency or development organization anywhere that is actually fulfilling a development mission in accordance with international law.

The array of descriptive categories for the three areas of public organizations that can be evaluated using the two tests (international development organizations, international development agencies of national governments, and domestic development agencies) is presented in Table 10, below, with some examples as well as suggestions for renaming agencies in order to recognize their actual functions more clearly, behind the current euphemism of ‘development’ (Lempert 2015c).

For readers who wish to directly walk through the application and scoring of the eight questions of the two tests, the scoring of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is presented in a chart in the annex to the full piece on-line.

Table 10

Results Matrix for Classification, Reform, and Renaming of ‘Development’ and Related Agencies

Table 10 continued

Conclusion

Public oversight of both international and domestic agencies in the area of development is clearly failing.

The idealized public administration charts and the two tests of functions of development agencies that are presented in this article can expose the problem and point to solutions, but like other public administration tools, these must be in the hands of those willing and able to use them.

NOTES

* An extended version of this paper can be found at https://www.sociostudies.org/journal/arti cles/450883/.

¹ See Lempert, D. (unpublished) A Treatise on International Development Law (under review) and Lempert, D. (unpublished) We Now Have the Tools and Infrastructure to Hold Donors and NGOs in International Development to their Own Standards (under review).

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